

Emergency Response Procedure

Historic Afton TSF Kamloops, British Columbia

EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROCEDURE Operation, Maintenance, and Surveillance Plan

Historic Afton TSF Kamloops, British Columbia

KGHM – Ajax Copper Gold Project 200-124 Seymour St Kamloops, BC V2C 2E1

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
| PLAN REVIS | PLAN REVISIONS | | | | | | |
|------------|---------------------------|--|-----------|--|--|--|--|
| Revision # | Revision # Date Change By | | | | | | |
| Rev-A | November 27, 2013 | Original Draft | R. Maciak | | | | |
| Rev-01 | December 02, 2013 | Minor revisions based on feedback from Environment, Health, and Safety Teams | R. Maciak | | | | |
| Rev-02 | December 16, 2013 | Maps updated, tier 1 and 2 trigger levels revised based on new dam elev. info. | R. Maciak | | | | |
| Rev-03 | February 20, 2014 | Added New Gold-New Afton to ERP notification list. | R. Maciak | | | | |
| Rev-04 | April 25, 2014 | Updated information for General Manager and H&S Manager | R. Maciak | | | | |
| Rev-05 | November 25, 2014 | Updated mine manager info, piezometer monitoring schedule, weekly inspection procedure, comments received during the annual ERP OMS test, and secondary access map. | R. Maciak | | | | |
| Rev-06 | June 29, 2015 | Updated General Manager contact info, monitoring and surveillance sections based on Sec 3.6 of the CDA Dam Safety Guidelines, roles and responsibilities and inundation map. | R. Maciak | | | | |
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Revision 6 - Approved for Use By the Environmental Manager:

Print

Sign

Date



| EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT CONTACT LIST | | | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Support/Service | Agency or Company | Address and Tel | Contact | | |
| Engineering | BGC Engineering | 234 St. Paul Street Kamloops, BC V2C 6G4 Tel: 250-374-8600 | Warren Newcomen, P.Eng., P.E. Brian Nachtigal, P.Eng. | | |
| | Golder Associates | 220-1755 Springfield Rd., Kelowna, BC V1Y 5V5 Tel: 250-860-8424 | Gerald Imada, P.Eng. | | |
| Earth Works Contractor | Acres Enterprises | 971 Camosun Cres Kamloops, BC V2C 6G1 250-372-2215 | Jason Paige Jim Laird | | |
| | Dawson Construction | 1212 McGill Rd Kamloops, BC 250-374-3657 | Brook Webster | | |
| | Sexqeltkemc Enterprises Inc (SEI) | 102-440 Squilax- Anglemont Rd, Chase, BC, V0E 1M2 | Chris Leatherdale | | |
| General Support | New Gold | Box 948 Stn Main Kamloops, BC V2C 5N4 | Scott Davidson | | |

Other Emergency Contact listed on page iv.

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This Emergency Response Plan (ERP) has been developed in accordance with the Health Safety and Reclamation Code for Mines in British Columbia Section 10.6.8 regarding Emergency Preparedness for major impoundments classified as "high" and "very high" failure consequence. The Historic Afton Tailings Storage Facility West Dam is classified as an Extreme Consequence Dam under dam safety guidelines.

The Historic Afton Tailings Storage Facility (TSF) was decommissioned in 1997 by Teck Ltd. and Afton Operating Corporation. The official closure plan called for a dry closure approach that estimated a natural depletion of water levels in seven years based on a site water balance (Kala, 1997). Since 2012 the water level in the TSF has dropped significantly reducing the risk of storm water overtopping the West Dam, the level of risk posed to downstream residents in the event of a major structural failure of the West Dam, as well as inundation of the New Gold site via the East Dam Spillway.

The ERP defines individual responsibilities and procedures relating to:

- 1. Hazard Analysis of Operation;
- 2. Emergency Equipment;
- 3. Trained Personnel;
- 4. Implementation of the ERP and Incident Command;
- 5. Directions to the site;
- 6. Contact lists;
- 7. Training; and
- 8. Records.


Guidance for document preparation was obtained from the British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines guidance document (2013). The plan includes facility information, hazard analysis based on previous dam safety reports, evaluation and classification of an emergency, procedures to end the emergency, contact information for KGHMI staff, engineers on record, and regulatory offices, as well as the identification of Emergency Action responsibilities.

2.0 FACILITY INFORMATION

Figure 1 provides the location of the Afton TSF relative to the City of Kamloops, within British Columbia, Canada. **Figure 2** provides the layout of the Afton TSF and related facility elements and access roads.

General impoundment and embankment information is summarized below:

- <u>Official Structure Name:</u> Afton Tailings Storage Facility
- Located on: Trans-Canada Highway (Hwy 1) 11km West of Kamloops, BC
- Location: Sec 35 TP 19 R 19, Sec 26 TP 19 R 19,
- Embankment Owner and Operator: KGHM International
- Embankment: Low permeability compacted earth-rock fill dam to 705.8 masl
- Embankment Current Maximum Height: 30 50 m
- <u>West Dam Embankment Crest Length:</u> ~ 1,300 m
- <u>West Dam Embankment Crest Width:</u> ~ 35 m
- <u>East Dam Embankment Crest Length:</u> ~ 860 m
- <u>East Dam Embankment Crest Width:</u> ~ 20 m
- Spillway Invert Elevation: 705.5 masl
- <u>Downstream Flood Path</u>: The downstream flood path will proceed along the Cherry Creek channel to the West, and through a spillway that drains into the New Afton open pit to the East.
- Downstream Hazard Classification: Extreme
- Number of Homes in the Flood Path: ~ 30
- <u>Downstream Property Description</u>: A permanent population of up to 100 residents exists 1.4 km downstream of the TSF West Dam. The Trans-Canada Highway and Canadian Pacific Railway track are also located down gradient of the West dam. The New Gold-New Afton mine site is located directly adjacent to the East dam.
- <u>Access</u>: As shown of **Figure 1**, access to the site from Kamloops is via Highway 1 to approximately 11 km West of Kamloops. Access to the TSF from a locked gate on Highway 1 is illustrated in **Figure 2**.






Figure 2: Access and Facilities




Figure 3: Site Layout with Aerial Imaging

3.0 OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, AND SURVEILLANCE

<u>Operation</u>

The historic Afton TSF is no longer an operating facility. Therefore, no pumps, piping networks, or spigots are currently in use, and no tailings material is currently being deposited at the facility. Details on pond elevation increases that will trigger an emergency response can be found in section 5.1.

<u>Maintenance</u>

Matters regarding dam erosion control, noxious weed control, diversion channel and spillway repairs, dust control, and road maintenance will be addressed as needed. Determining when maintenance is required is done by way of visual inspections, as well as recommendations put forth by third party qualified professionals in annual dam inspections, and five year dam safety reviews. Detail on the frequency of inspections is provided below.

<u>Surveillance</u>

Monitoring of the historic Afton TSF requires two forms of surveillance: (i) visual inspections for structural deficiencies; and (ii) monitoring via instrumentation.

Following Section 3.6 of the *Canadian Dam Association Dam Safety Guidelines* visual inspections will take place via *Routine Inspections, Engineering Inspections* and *Special Inspections* (Canadian Dam Association, 2007). Routine visual inspections for the Afton TSF will take place once a week from March 1 to October 31, and then decrease to bi-weekly from November 1 to February 28. Visual inspections will include an assessment of the pond levels and beach areas, East and West Dams, all seepage dams and associated ditches and ponds, the spillway, as well as the Alkali Creek Diversion Channel. Inspection details will be recorded on a *Weekly Inspection Checklist* (Appendix A). Maintenance issues noted on the inspection form will be immediately relayed to the Ajax Project Environmental Manager and will be addressed in a timely fashion based on the urgency of the maintenance concern. Signs of structural problems such as cracking or bulging of dam walls may trigger the implementation of the Emergency Response Procedure (Section 5).

Monitoring via instrumentation is completed by KGHMI Ajax staff as well as by the New Gold Environment group. Instrumentation monitoring will be done in accordance with Permit Requirements listed in the PE-3904 environmental monitoring and compliance permit. This includes peizometric, dust fall, and vegetation sampling. Six vibrating wire piezometers (VWP) were installed in the East and West Dams in 2014. Data is downloaded once a month by KGHM field staff and recorded electronically on VWP data collection sheets. Data is then transmitted to the Engineer of Record (EOR) for quality assurance and review purposes. If the EOR recognizes deviations from known trends in the piezometer data KGHM is immediately notified. More frequent monitoring should occur if:

- Flooding causes the tailings impoundment water level to exceed elevation 701 masl;
- Unusual seepage develops at or near the dam;
- After a seismic event; and
- Any piezometers show sudden or unexplained changes in water level;
- In the event that any erratic or unreasonable readings are identified, the response protocol outlined in the Emergency Response procedure should be implemented.

In addition to routine visual inspections, the Afton TSF Embankments and ancillary structures will undergo a formal *Annual Dam Inspection* that will be carried out by a third party professional engineer registered and in good standing with the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of British Columbia (APEGBC). A report will be produced based on the engineered inspection and submitted to the BC Ministry of Mines by March 31 each year. Twice per decade a *Five Year Dam Safety Review* will be carried out by a qualified professional in good standing with APEGBC. All Weekly Inspection Checklists, as well as *Annual Dam Inspection* and *Five Year Dam Safety Review* Reports will be stored indefinitely in hard and electronic copy in the Ajax Project Environmental Department filing system.

4.0 HAZARD ANALYSIS OF OPERATION

KGHM International has identified 11 potential hazard scenarios for the Historic Afton Tailings Impoundment that would constitute some level of emergency conditions and require declaration of an emergency.

- 1. Turning and merging with highway traffic at the primary entrance gate located on the shoulder of Highway 1;
- Potentially hazardous driving conditions on the steep access road located 1.2km from primary entrance gate;
- 3. Dam failure causing flow of liquefied tailings into the natural environment;
- 4. Dam failure or overtopping due to extreme rainfall event;

- 5. New Gold underground operations experience a flow of tailings into their mine;
- 6. Injuries or incidents while conducting sampling of water, tailings, and vegetation;
- 7. Water from the tailings pond seeps through structures into the natural environment;
- 8. Fugitive dust emissions leave the site during high wind events;
- 9. Individuals trespass on the site and become injured;
- 10. Wildlife and or livestock become injured while traversing the site; and
- 11. Wildlife such as bears attack individuals working on site.

5.0 CONDITIONS AND RESPONSES

The section describes the detection and evaluation of site conditions which will result in an emergency condition, and includes discussion of procedures specific to timely and reliable detection, evaluation and classification of an existing or potential emergency condition.

A **Notification Flowchart** is provided at the front of this ERP to use for contacting companies and agencies as part of the response action. Also included at the front of this ERP is a **Response Support Contact List** that provides contact information for response support, including engineering, on-site services, materials, and equipment suppliers.

5.1 Tier 1 and 2 Conditions and Responses

Tier 1 Condition:

The Tier 1 condition is intended to provide a means of observing and evaluating the developing emergency in order to allow adequate pre-planning by all potentially involved parties. Tier 1 conditions are considered to exist if KGHM International is unable to control the rise in supernatant pond level due to precipitation intensity, and continued precipitation is likely. A Tier 1 response will be required if the supernatant pond level reaches an elevation of 702.5 masl.

Tier 1 Response Actions:

1. Implement requirements in **Notification Flowchart** (front of ERP) to appraise potentially involved parties of the current and developing situation.

- 2. Implement continuous (24–hour) monitoring of supernatant pond level and location along with piezometer download and data anlysis.
- 3. Suspend all work on and downstream of the embankment.
- 4. Notify downstream residents and businesses and request evacuation if overtopping of supernatant water is imminent.

Tier 1 response will be coordinated by KGHMI's Safety Superintendent and Mine Manager. KGHMI Staff will notify the Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Natural Gas Health and Safety Inspector, New Gold Mine, and the RCMP to notify each group of the developing situation and the preparation for road closures along Highway 1 (Trans-Canada Highway) between the TSF primary access gate and Greenstone Mountain Road as a precaution.

Tier 2 Condition:

The Tier 2 condition is intended to provide a plan for declaring an emergency to allow sufficient time for emergency actions. Tier 2 conditions are considered to have occurred when the supernatant pond elevations are expected to reach within 1.5m of the West Dam Embankment Crest. A Tier 2 response will be required if the supernatant pond level reaches a trigger elevation of 704 masl.

Tier 2 Response Actions:

- 1. Implement requirements in **Notification Flowchart** (front of ERP) to apprise potentially involved parties.
- 2. Suspend all monitoring activities on the embankment and evacuate mine personnel from the area.
- 3. Suspend all work downstream of the embankment.
- 4. Notify downstream residents and businesses and request that an evacuation order of all properties that may potentially be impacted.

A Tier 2 response will be coordinated by KGHMI's Safety Superintendent and Mine Manager. KGHMI Staff will notify the Ministry of Energy, Mines, and Natural Gas Health and Safety Inspector, New Gold Mine, and the RCMP to notify each group of the developing situation and the preparation for road closures along Highway 1 (Trans-Canada Highway) between the TSF primary access gate and Greenstone Mountain Road as a precaution.

5.2 Other Conditions

The emergency actions included above assume extreme precipitation is the cause of conditions that could induce the rise of supernatant pond levels to dangerous levels. If for any other reason (i.e. excluding precipitation), an emergency occurs at the TSF the Tier 1 **Notification Flowchart** (front of ERP) shall be evoked. Examples of other conditions or emergencies are noted in the Section 3 **Hazard Analysis**.

5.3 Emergency Stand Down

The Health and Safety Manager or Mine Manager will determine if and when an emergency condition no longer exists.

The Safety Superintendent or Mine Manager may declare the end to a developing emergency situation if the supernatant pond level stabilizes and starts decreasing prior to reaching Tier 2 trigger levels, precipitation has ceased, and monitoring and evaluation indicate no stability risk due to embankment piezometer elevations.

An emergency situation resulting from an embankment failure will be declared over when failure flow ceases into the Cherry Creek basin and a determination has been made that there is no potential for additional failure or flow from the impoundment.

5.4 Follow-up Procedures

Following emergency response and mitigation, the KGHMI Safety Superintendent and Mine Management team will conduct a formal Incident Investigation Meeting to review all conditions leading up to the emergency, response actions, and favorable and unfavorable results. The team will meet with all individuals that were directly involved with the emergency response, including local, provincial and federal agencies. The product of the meeting will be an Incident Investigation Report, which will describe the conditions that contributed to the emergency, how the emergency team reacted in terms of actions and timing, and recommendations for improving response procedures and response times.

Depending on the recommendations from the Incident Investigation Meeting, the Mine Management Team may contact residents and business owners in the Cherry Creek area down gradient of the TSF to discuss how they were affected by the dam failure. Any recommendations that result from such meetings with residents or business owners will be included in the Incident Investigation Report.

6.0 NOTIFICATION

The Notification Flowchart, presented at the front of this ERP, identifies downstream persons potentially first affected by tailings/flood waters, and provides a notification flowchart to be used in the event of an emergency. In the case of a West Dam emergency the RCMP will notify residents of the downstream trailer park and barricade all appropriate roadways. The flowchart applies to all conditions, but the message conveyed for a Tier 1 condition must be different than for a Tier 2 condition. The intent of Tier 1 notifications is to warn all team members of the potential need for action in the short term, whereas Tier 2 notifications require immediate implementation of short term emergency actions. New Gold – New Afton shall be notified immediately in the event that a Tier 1 or Tier 2 response is triggered.

If Tier 1 conditions occur, notification will be initiated immediately in accordance with the **Notification Flowchart.** The primary goal of notification under Tier 1 conditions is to inform of a potential emergency condition.

If Tier 2 conditions occur, notification will be started immediately in accordance with the **Notification Flowchart.** The primary goal of notification under Tier 2 conditions is to prevent loss of life. The Notification Flowchart is intended as a guide to organize priorities in a response scenario. However, if one member of the emergency team is unavailable or cannot be reached, it is imperative that another response team member ensures the proper notifications are implemented.

7.0 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

In the event of an emergency or unusual situation the reporting procedure outlined on Page IV of this report shall be followed as quickly as possible. Once notifications have been made to KGHM Ajax Mining Management and emergency response personnel such as local fire and police, it is important that the dam owner's staff and community responders work to establish an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) and Site Command Post (SCP) to coordinate efforts in an efficient and organized manner. Table 5 outlines an Incident Command Model and the typical roles for EOCs and SCP.

| Type of EOC | Typical Role | | |
|---------------|---|--|--|
| | | | |
| SCP | The SCP manages the emergency in the vicinity of the dam and | | |
| | reservoir. Dam owner staff and contractors attempt mitigation | | |
| | measures if required and also perform initial notifications and | | |
| | coordinate broader response activities until a KGHM EOC is set | | |
| | up to assist. | | |
| Dam owner EOC | The KGHM EOC will be located at 124 Seymour Office. Upon | | |
| | notification of a major dam emergency, the KGHM EOC will | | |
| | provide comprehensive support for site activities by coordinating | | |
| | site security, logistical requirements, ongoing communication | | |
| | with stakeholders and media, and technical and administrative | | |
| | support. The KGHM EOC team will be comprised of the Mine | | |
| | Manager, General Manager, Environmental Manager, and | | |
| | External Affairs Manager, as well as corporate level managers | | |
| | and other technical staff as required. | | |
| Provincial | In a serious emergency, the British Columbia government may | | |
| Government | activate a Government EOC to manage the emergency at the | | |
| EOC | provincial level upon notification from the KGHM EOC. | | |
| Municipal EOC | In a serious emergency, the City of Kamloops and TNRD may | | |
| | establish a municipal EOC upon notification from the KGM EOC. | | |

Table 1: Incident Command Model


8.0 INUNDATION MAPPING

In November 2014, KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. completed a dam breach inundation study of the historic Afton TSF. Figure 4 illustrates topographical cross sections used for inundation analysis as well as key infrastructure. Figures 5, 6, and 7 illustrate inundation areas for the East and West Dams, respectively. All inundation figures demonstrate the maximum modelled flow depth that would occur during a probable maximum flood (PMF) event (i.e. worst case scenario, also known as the "Rainy Day" scenario). The flow is estimated to take roughly one hour to reach Kamloops Lake and would potentially inundate sections of Highway 1, as well as the downstream trailer park and ranch properties.

In late 2014 KGHM Ajax Mining Inc. took steps to dry out the historic TSF by transferring approximately 500,000 m³ of water to the New Gold – New Afton TSF. This measure is expected to improve overall long-term dam safety, as well as substantially reduce the probability of a "Rainy Day" scenario occurring.

Emergency Response Plan

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




Figure 5: East Dam Inundation Map

Figure 6: West Dam Inundation Map No. 1



Figure 7: West Dam Inundation Map No. 2



9.0 PLAN DISTRIBUTION AND REVISION

Individuals or agencies that have been provided with a copy of this plan are listed in Table 6. A list of plan revisions, including dates and authorization signatures, is provided at the front of this ERP.

| Agency or Company | Address and Telephone | Recipients | EAP Copy Received |
|--|--|---|--|
| Ministry of Energy and Mines | 441 Columbia St, Kamloops, BC, V2C 2T3, 250.371.3780, 250.371.3714 | Stephen Rothman, Mine Safety Officer Tom Charles, Inspector of Mines | #1 of 14 #2 of 14 |
| KGHM International Ltd., Ajax Project | 200-124 Seymour St, Kamloops, BC, V2C 2E1, 250.374.5446 | Dan Ferriter Piotr Paradisz Clyde Gillespie Kate Parsons Chris Wild Jason Haller Carlos Penuniri Yepiz Trevor Fulcher Robert Maciak | #3 of 15 #4 of 15 #5 of 15 #6 of 15 #7 of 15 #8 of 15 #9 of 15 #10 of 15 #11 of 15 |
| New Gold – New Afton | Box 948 Stn Main, Kamloops, BC, V2C 5N4, 250.214.0625 | Scott Davidson | #12 of 15 |
| BGC Engineering | 234 St Paul St, Kamloops, BC, V2C 6G4, 250.319.9599 | Warren Newcomen Brian Nachtigal | #13 of 15 #14 of 15 |
| Golder Associates | 220-1755 Springfield Rd., Kelowna, BC V1Y 5V5 Tel: 250-860-8424 | Gerald Imada, P.Eng. | #15 of 15 |

Table 2: Plan Distribution List

This ERP will be reviewed by the Health and Safety Manager and Joint Occupational Health and Safety Committee. Any changes in the tailings impoundment and diversion system will be noted in the ERP. Components of the ERP will be reviewed and revised based on any new changes. A list of plan revisions, including dates and authorization signatures, is provided at the front of this ERP.

The Health and Safety Manager will also conduct an annual training session on emergency response, including a review of the ERP. Participants in the annual training will discuss procedures and responsibilities prior to and during an emergency, as described in the ERP.

10.0 REFERENCES

Kala, 1997. Afton Mine Hughes Lake Restoration: Hydrogeologic Study (Water Balance)

BCMEM, 2013. Basics of an Emergency Response Plan.

Canadian Dam Association, 2007. *Dam Safety Guidelines 2007 (2013 Edition)*. Section 3.6: Surveillance. Page 35 – 37.

APPENDIX A: WEEKLY INSPECTION FORM

Historic Afton TSF Visual Inspection Form

Date:_____

Inspector(s):_____

| Weather Conditions: | | |
|---------------------|------|------|
| | | |

Revision: A - Revised on: 11-AUG-2014

Owner: Enviromental Department

| WEST DAM | | COMMENTS | MONITOR | INVESTIGATE | REPAIR |
|----------|----------------------|----------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 1 | Surface Cracking | | | | |
| 2 | Horizontal Alignment | | | | |
| 3 | Erosion | | | | |
| 4 | Warning Signs | | | | |
| 5 | Vegetation Condition | | | | |

| EAS | ST DAM AND SPILLWAY | COMMENTS | MONITOR | INVESTIGATE | REPAIR |
|-----|------------------------|----------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 1 | Surface Cracking | | | | |
| 2 | 2 Horizontal Alignment | | | | |
| 3 | B Erosion | | | | |
| 4 | Warning Signs | | | | |
| 5 | Vegetation Condition | | | | |

| ALKAIL CREEK DIVERSION AND DAM | | COMMENTS | MONITOR | INVESTIGATE | REPAIR |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|----------|---------|-------------|--------|
| | 1 Surface Cracking | | | | |
| | 2 Erosion | | | | |
| | 3 Warning Signs | | | | |
| | 4 Water Level | | | | |

| NW & SW SEEPAGE POND DAMS | | COMMENTS | MONITOR | INVESTIGATE | REPAIR |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------|---------|-------------|--------|
| 1 | Surface Cracking | | | | |
| 2 | Horizontal Alignment | | | | |
| 3 | Erosion | | | | |
| 4 | Warning Signs | | | | |
| 5 | Water levels | | | | |

